This study investigates the impact of banks’ funding liquidity risk on their risk-taking behaviour. We find empirical evidence that banks facing lower funding liquidity risk take more risk. We con- sider banks with higher deposits to have lower funding liquidity risk because deposits shield banks from run risk in the presence of deposit insurance. Banks having higher deposits are less likely to face a funding shortfall immediately and bank managers’ aggressive risk-taking behaviour is less likely to be audited. Our results show that increases in bank deposits increase risk-weighted assets and liquidity creation, consistent with the findings of Acharya and Naqvi (2012) that banks lend aggressively at lower loan rates in response to higher deposits. Our results are also consistent with the findings of Keeley (1990) that deposit insurance creates a moral hazard problem for excessive risk taking by banks in response to increases in deposits. We affirm that deposit ratios are positively related to bank risks as captured by Z-scores.