Thanks for sending over the schedule detailing the components of the $85m. Now that we have the back-up in hand, I can only echo our initial gut reaction.
In our view, the appropriate place to treat potential debt adjustments is in the purchase agreement's Indebtedness definition (linking to a schedule if required), so that any outstanding balances on agreed items act as deductions at closing - rather than as reductions of the headline price. CGE's binding offer of December 8th did not indicate any particular deductions. CGE's SAPA draft delivered on December 2nd indicated only Reglan and litigation liabilities as Indebtedness deductions - and the Reglan reserve was in fact already planned to be absorbed by the sellers through its inclusion in the working capital adjustment to the extent not already paid out at closing.
Pensions ($40m): this item has been disclosed all the way back to the CIM and throughout the data room and the due diligence process pre-December 8. Other bidders gave us full clarity in their offers as to its treatment (as debt or not) in their offers. This was not a confirmatory d.d. discovery. As a result, we consider its introduction at this point to be a re-trade and a price chip.
MERP ($11m): similar to pensions, this has been disclosed through due diligence pre-December 8, and was not flagged in CGE's binding offer or the SAPA where there was ample opportunity to do so. As a result, we also consider this deduction to be a re-trade and a price chip.
Reglan reserve ($22.5m): this item may be paid before closing, and furthermore was already proposed on our side to be picked up through the working capital adjustment if not yet paid. As a result, we consider this deduction from headline price to be a double-dip and a price chip.
Tax items ($4m): responsibility for pre- and post-closing taxes is already fully addressed in section 9 of the SAPA. As a result, we consider this to be a pure price chip.
Other items (c.$7m): none of these items are individually material to a >$1 billion transaction, and furthermore your side gives no credit to the potential for several similarly sized positive items to come in the future (inbound settlements and deposit releases). As a result, we also consider this to be a pure price chip.
Additional price reduction ($45m): your side has linked this to (i) certain ex-US IP that is used by Meda and was never on offer in this transaction perimeter; (ii) various unquantified contingent liabilities that we do not believe are material; and (iii) the perceived benefit of reducing the indemnity cap from 10% (CGE's position) or 5% (Meda's position), to 2%. Clearly we don't agree with the principle, and the magnitude (3.5% of purchase price) cannot be attractive as a trade, given that it exceeds the reduction from our position on the cap (5% to 2%)... not to mention that our position also had a 2% deductible. So this is also a clear price chip from our point of view.
In summary, this aggregates to an enormous price chip (10.2%) that comes at the [in theory] late stages of a deal, and none of it relates to material relevant items that weren't already known or addressed at the time of the Dec 8 binding offer and the Dec 2 SAPA draft submission.
I think you can imagine our client is enormously turned off by this approach and we struggle to see how to move forward from here, particularly when taking into account the significant hurdles that remain in the most recent SAPA draft, and the long/complex sign-to-close process inherent in a CGE deal.