What is more relevant to our study is that powerful CEOs can exert a strong influence on a firm’s board composition. Findings by Westphal and Zajac (1995) suggest that powerful CEOs have a greater say in new director selection. Lynall, Golden, and Hillman (2003) argue that CEO power relative to important external stakeholders can influence board composition such that boards will reflect the social network of the CEO when the CEO has dominant power. In sum, powerful CEOs not only have a strong influence on firm strategic decision and firm performance but also can shape governance practices (Boyd, 1994; Dalton & Kesner, 1987). If CFOs who exhibit higher LSM with CEOs tend to receive a higher level of compensation and are more likely to become board members at the focal firms, these relationships would be particularly strong for powerful CEOs who have a greater say in executive compensation and board nomination decisions. In contrast, when the CEO has less power, he or she may not be able to influence CFO compensation decisions or the chance of a CFO becoming a board member. To further verify the underlying assumption of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we propose that the relationships between CEO-CFO LSM and CFO-related personal outcomes will be stronger for more powerful CEOs.