We choose firm mergers and acquisitions (M&As) as our empirical context to examine the relationship between CEO-CFO LSM and firm strategic decisions because M&As require active participation from both CEOs and CFOs. Although CEOs typically make final M&A decisions (Graham, Harvey, & Puri, 2015), CFOs play a critical role in identifying acquisition targets, conducting due diligence, arranging financing, and engaging in post-deal execution (Altman, 2002; Huyett & Koller, 2011). If CEO-CFO LSM reflects ingratiation of CEOs by CFOs, CFOs who show high LSM with the CEOs will be less willing to voice different opinions and play the devil’s advocate role in decision-making (Schwenk, 1990). Consequently, CEOs may face less constraint in decision making and overestimate their judgments and capabilities (Park, Westphal, & Stern, 2011), thereby undertaking intensive M&A programs (Malmendier & Tate, 2008).