Konishi and Yasuda (2004) find that the implementation of capital adequacy requirements has reduced risk taking by commercial banks. Similarly, Repullo (2005) finds that bank risk taking is negatively related to capital requirements. Calem and Rob (1999) in fact find the relation between capital and bank risk-taking is U-shaped as severely under-capitalized banks do experience a risk reduction when bank capital increases but in well-capitalized banks, bank risk actually increases in the long run in response to more bank capital. However, other studies have argued that as capital regulation induces banks to increase capital to avoid incurring penalties for violating minimum capital requirements, increasing bank capital actually has the desired effect in reducing bank risk ( Furlong and Keeley, 1989; Lee and Hsieh, 2013 ). In support of the risk reduction view, Hyun and Rhee (2011) provide evidence to show that banks typically reduce high-risk assets instead of issuing new equity to meet higher capital ratios.