In a world of capital market frictions and uncertain investment opportunities, holding cash enables firms to invest in value-creating projects without delay. This precautionary savings story has been the primary focus of the academic literature. Earlier work focused on measuring firms’ access to the capital markets (Opler et al. 1999), while more recent work has focused on the role of increasing investment uncertainty (Martin and Santomero 1997; Boyle and Guthrie 2003; Bates, Kahle, and Stulz 2009; Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell 2014).Not all cash is held for precautionary savings.Thus, uncertainty and financing frictions alone may not explain the huge run-up in corporate cash. Foley et al. (2007) and Graham and Leary (2018) explore foreign taxes as an alternative explanation for why firms hold cash. The United States taxes the income of foreign subsidiaries, but only when the income is repatriated.1 Thus, when the foreign tax rate is less than the U.S. rate, there has been an incentive to delay repatriation (Faulkender and Petersen 2012 and Graham, Hanlon, and Shevlin 2010). Firms’ objective to minimize the present value of taxes may result in a buildup of cash in foreign subsidiaries—often called “trapped cash.” Foley et al. (2007) show in a cross-sectional time-series regression that lower foreign tax rates are associated with higher total and higher foreign cash.